"WE moved by echelon to Mompach, arriving there just in time to line up for noon chow. No sooner there than the German 88s began lobbing in shells in an attempted strike at the artillery units which had been emplaced in the vicinity of the town. Rookies at the game or war, we did not realize at the time that we were the target; rather we supposed that the neighboring big guns were tossing shells over on the other side of the Sauer.

In the middle of the dinner Pfc. Albert Marshall walked into the aid station and asked to have a slight shrapnel wound of the hand dressed. One of the personnel of the station after looking bland for a minute, turned to a buddy and asked, 'My God! Were those coming in?' Those were only the first of a punctual rain of shells which came to disturb the company during the dinner and supper hours of the next two weeks. We suffered no casualties but a GI in a neighboring Engineer company was brought to us with a shrapnel wound of the head, struck down in front of his billet just a block down the street."
The 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been in position with the 87th Division when the 304th relieved the 324th. On January 27th they were attached in support of the regiment and worked as such in the closest cooperation from then on until February 23rd. Some of the positions which they had already established were maintained and others opened up to coordinate with the plans which were being worked out by the regimental staff. Particularly, in the northern fringe of the Log City woods were these positions of value, because of their ability when necessary to bring direct fire to bear upon a desired objective. For example, it is noted in one of the after-action reports: "February 7th. Fired 37 rnds." and "February 8th. Fired 125 rnds. Excellent results; armor-piercing shells. Positions from high ground back of Echternach." On February 23rd the 691st was relieved from attachment and replaced by the 808th TD which came to the regiment as a completely motorized outfit.

So the curtain had finally risen and the first seemingly aimless lines of dialogue were being uttered. Action began to shape its course. Observation and reconnaissance were the order of the day; and observation there was with a vengeance for twenty-four hours of the day. There was high ground to be occupied; there were patrols to be run. The high ground was available and it overlooked the bends and stretches of the Sauer in which lay the towns of Echternach and Edingen and Minden and Ralingen and Godendorf. Due east and slightly south of these positions was Trier. In the minds of everyone this had become lodged as one of the natural objectives. The drive, when it came, would probably be a pincer directed at this point.
The machine was in gear and the gears were beginning to shift--but there was still a little more preparation to be made before the real push-off.

ON January 27th, for example, this entry appears in the regimental journal. "Request to battalions for all excess sub-machine guns and carbines to be sent to Regtl. Hq. to equip combat patrol." And on January 29th, "Message, S-3 to battalions, for five EM from each battalion to report to Service Co. to remain with Lt. McCarron's Tigers. Men to be selected because of interest in this type of work. Report tonight with all equipment." Thus was born the Tiger Patrol which wrote one of the more ill-fated but nonetheless glorious pages into the history of the regiment. Patrols from the other side of the Sauer--enemy patrols--had been coming over, hiding by day, prowling by night and stealing back over the river with whatever information they had been able to pick up when the end of their three days' rations had been reached.
Their information was being of help to the enemy. There could be no doubt of this. For example there is one entry in the regimental journal which more than amply bears this out. (Entry No. 327) "S-2 385th reports I & R Sgt. in 304th 3rd Bn. CP. Now reports 15 rnds. large calibre arty. fire on 3rd Bn. CP. Fire quite accurate. No report of casualties." God be praised for that last little note in the message. There were no casualties --but how they were escaped is still a wonder. The artillery fire practically described a ring about the CP without actually ever hitting it. The moral to the story--and there is a moral--is that for the fire to be as accurate as it was meant only one thing: exact location, accurate coordinates had been provided for the German artillery. That this had been done through the medium of a German patrol--well, there was very little doubt about it in the minds of the staff.

Something was needed to stop this infiltration and, if possible and practical, to do some counter-infiltration. Prisoners would be helpful if they could be obtained. It was felt that some might be willing to talk. So, out of necessity, the Tiger Patrol "sprang forth full blown" out of the head of the Regimental Jove and back to Berbourg these chosen men went, bag and baggage, volunteers all of them; mostly privates and privates first class with a scattering of non-coms among them, to be trained by and with their leader, Lt. Edmond S. McCarron, who disliked ceremony and, therefore, was known to his men simply and unaffectedly as "Mac."

WITH such experiences behind them it is not surprising that these three men may have felt a certain sensation of let-down when they were finally committed to join what they must have considered a "green" outfit. It was not to be long before this feeling faded and they were to find themselves plunged deep into work and participating in a helter-skelter, almost devil-take-the-hindmost dash across Germany. Their first job of work, in fact, came five days after their arrival with the regiment. G Company had an outpost located in a deserted barn near Osweiler. On the night of January 28th, they experienced an unannounced visit from a German patrol seeking the temporary shelter of the same barn.

Before they could be properly surrounded the Germans fled with the outpost in full chase. Result: two Germans wounded, one fatally ; one German non-com escaped. Most important of all was the information which was elicited from the survivor. He belonged to the 1st Platoon, the 3rd Company, the 320th Infantry Regiment of the 212th Volksgrenadier Division. His mission was a three-day reconnaissance and patrol, to set up an observation post in the woods on our side of the river, if possible to take some prisoners and to return to their company at the end of three days when their rations would be spent. From him also was learned the location of German battalion and company command posts and one or two other items which were helpful in sketching in more complete details of enemy dispositions. With this job of work done by the IPW another cog in the machine had slipped into, place and the zero hour was that much closer. The time was drawing near.

On 4 February the command post moved about six kilometers northeast from Boudeler to Herborn. This was, in turn, about six kilometers due south of Echternach, which lay sprawled out on the banks of the Sauer. Looking at the map one could almost sense the meaning of the move. It was like the tightening, the gathering up and a tensing of the muscles for a broad-jump. What, when, how and who were still the big questions;--but of the fact that there was something brewing there could be no doubt.
Patrols and observation posts, in the meanwhile, continued their regular, sometimes monotonous, sometimes engrossing routine. The Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon under the leadership of Lt. Marion D. Cloud (also assistant S-2 of the Regiment) maintained, during this period from January 27th to February 23rd, a continuous chain of OPs--a total of six-on a twenty-four-hour basis. This platoon, out of Headquarters Company, had a total active strength of twenty-six men with two of these assigned to the command post proper. This left around two dozen for active duty.

It can really be said of them that they "covered the waterfront," their watchfulness extending to a point a good deal upstream from Echternach and sweeping down south, all around the bend as far as Hinkel and Born. It was here that these men learned the lesson, not written into the manuals, that good observation is most of the time impossible without inviting observation in return. It was here that they learned the truth of the lesson that observation is useless unless you can get the news back. Communications must be kept in! And it was here also that they learned to tell the difference by ear between incoming and outgoing "mail," between 88s and mortars, between the sharp staccato of German machine guns and our own BARS.