EARLY the next morning Lt. Katz and his men took off along the same road. But when they came to the fork they veered to the left away from Platten and very soon forsook the road completely and began their scramble through wooded, hillside country in an almost straight line pointed at Wehlen. 1800 hours and nightfall found them past most of the rough terrain (with the exception of the last and largest hill)--and dog-tired. The company was stretched out through the woods to the west of Wehlen and about 600 to 700 yards from the town. At this point it was decided that it would be far wiser to investigate the immediate surroundings before taking a full company any further. The second squad of the 2nd platoon was chosen to reconnoiter and was sent down through the 1st platoon (which was leading) in order to enter and investigate the town.
They turned in as near perfect a piece of scouting as could be devised. Pfcs. Burns and Obrecht were the first and second scouts; S/Sgt. Ritter was in charge of the detail with Cpl. Peterson as his second-in-command and Pfc. Tomasek with a BAR covered the rear of the entire detail of some ten-odd men. There was not a sound made as they progressed down the winding dirt road leading into the town. When well within sight of the houses and practically in the streets of Wehlen, they stopped within several feet of German guards who were, in their own turn, patrolling. These, in fact, came so close that a hand reached out could actually have touched them. As a finishing touch, the relief for these guards arrived just then and, to the high edification of the Item patrol, they were able to hold their breaths and learn the countersign for the day.
Having ascertained what the general disposition of defense and enemy security for Wehlen was, these men turned back to make their report. They had gone scarcely a hundred yards back up the hill to where the company was waiting when they were startled out of their pleased composure by a stream of tracers passing over their heads and the chattering of an automatic gun which was different from the sound of any German gun they had yet heard. (This was later diagnosed as being a 20 mm gun located on the other side of the river in an embrasure near the bridge.) A few minutes later this was interrupted by a terrific explosion, the concussion throwing several men to the ground--where they were quickly followed by those who had not already been knocked down. The tracers continued for some time but finally lessened sufficiently for them to proceed on their way. Their report went in to the Company CP which was waiting impatiently back in the woods and from there by 300 radio back to the forward CP of Blue Battalion.
Meanwhile the I & R squad assigned to the 3rd was temporarily pulled off its assignment, after the taking of Platten, and called back to Wittlich for fresh orders. These concerned the setting up of an OP at the best possible point on the high ground overlooking the Moselle from the west bank. Observation of as much as was possible of the entire German thumb north and south of Zeltingen was to be established immediately. By the time the squad returned to Platten, naturally, it was dark. As usual, chances of making a daylight reconnaissance of the terrain and situation were entirely gone. Nevertheless they started out, reinforced by the communications crew of Headquarters Company and managed to stretch their Wire out of Platten for the better part of four thousand yards before it gave out and they were forced to turn back for a fresh supply. It was well past dawn by the time the full length of wire was finally in and they were able to ring the Tripod switch and transmit their first report. But by that time they were established in a central position from which they could observe most of the sector. By walking a little bit from that spot to another their observation became complete. Their OP was in; just in time to witness the taking of Wehlen.

ITEM Company had returned to Platten in the wee morning hours and had a chance at hot chow (this was supper served as breakfast!), but the "sleep" which was supposed to follow was replaced by an alert for immediate movement. Starting on the march again, the company retraced its steps over the same trail and past the same dead horses and shell craters which they had passed in the dark the night before. Throughout the morning and until mid-day the column curled around endlessly through the winding forest trails and edged its way in toward Wehlen. When they finally did jockey into their positions it was well past 1400 and by the time that the artillery preparation had been poured in on the town it was closer to 1500.

By 1600 it was possible to report (by virtue of the OP's roving reporter system) that "Wehlen was completely entered by I Company" and to submit detailed information on what general conditions were. The regimental OP covered this action by means of a runner who traversed the 2500 yards between the OP and Wehlen four times that day, in record time, so that the news of progress could get back promptly and accurately. This man, Pfc. Chris Lassarus, stayed with the forward observer of Item throughout the entire artillery preparation and attack. The OP itself would have been unable to approach any closer to the town and still maintain any amount of general observation. The roving reporter system worked just as well.
While Wehlen, with its excellent situation for river crossing, was falling into our hands, the 1st battalion was concluding its operations in the southern sector. At 1400 on March 13th the journal notes that "CO notified 1st Bn. CO to clean out pocket in their zone in bend of river." All that was left for them to do there, having already cleared Kesten and Piesport, was to neutralize the town of Minheim, sitting in a little valley all of its own and facing some thickly wooded slopes directly across the river. At some time during the night of the 13th, elements of the battalion must have moved out on this mission because, by 0345 of the 14th, the journal states: "1st battalion cleared Minheim. Took 13 PWs." At 0705 there was a more detailed report: "Baker Co. attacked 0200. Cleaned out Minheim, took 13 PWs and civs. No more enemy in town. Captured 1 MG nest intact. Completed 0430. Two men wounded by mortar fire. No casualties during attack on town. Withdrew 0435. Back at 0530. 1st Bn. patrol to east discovered nothing." It seems simple of course to say that Piesport had been cleared. It was cleared--but still under a heavy barrage. And, even when "cleared", there was still more work to be done. Witness the words of a C company analyst: "Several hours later the barrage slackened off and billets were established. OPs were set up and S/Sgt. Tice was given the task of leading a patrol in an attempt to cross the Moselle as it wound by the town. Using a small boat the patrol started the crossing when the line that was anchoring them to the shore broke and the boat swung downstream, coming to rest against the debris of a blown bridge further down-river. It was at this point that T/4 Ochs, due to his fluent German, volunteered to make a crossing with several riflemen. He succeeded and proceeded to search out the nearby buildings, capturing several prisoners and liberating a number of French soldiers who had been held captive here."

IN the meanwhile, as this action was transpiring in the southernmost tip of the regimental sector, the 3rd battalion was mopping up the remainder of the area. This work can be followed graphically in the journal. It begins with a notation at 0840 which gives a broad hint that the staff had a fairly good notion of what conditions were. "CG states that if Cues and Minheim are subjected to enemy fire it is not necessary to occupy them, so long as they can be covered by observation and fire." And the situation in these towns was precisely that; typically a battle of observation, a duel of artillery. In cases such as this American artillery was never found wanting. It was always more than adequate. But lest the mistake be made of underestimating the opposition, it must always be held very firmly in mind that German artillery was diabolically accurate. Their failing was one of supply--lack of ammunition. And the caution about this accuracy was being constantly sounded by the IPW team who, time and again, were brought face to face in their interrogations with the fact that enemy artillery emplacements had been prepared and scouted and perfected for weeks in advance with every possible target (such as roads, bridges, etc.) completely zeroed in. This was their homeland--and they knew every inch of the way.
One hour and ten minutes previous to the message last quoted from the journal there had been another message and entry. "L Company was 200 yards outside of Cues and continuing advance. At 0945, arty. observer directed fire at mortar position at 525--461. E Company in Cues, L Company 200 yards northwest, headed for town." One hour and twenty minutes later we read: "E and L Companies in Cues. Getting heavy 105 and 88 mm artillery fire. To stay until dark and retire to defensive positions. Heavy small-arms fire from across the river (from Bernkastel). Slight casualties." And again at 1305 the story continues: "Cues not completely cleared out. Many snipers. I Company is to assist in cleanup. Still receiving fire from across the river. 150 mm artillery fire falling in Lieser." To this, as a sort of a finish or an epilogue, was written, at 1715: "3rd Bn. reports E and L Company advance in Cues in the morning. Met strong resistance from the town through snipers, machine-gun fire and mortar and artillery from across river. Requested another company to move into town from other end. I Company called for but unable to move from Wehlen. PW reported most of enemy withdrew across river from Cues. E and L continued to mop up in Cues. Town now in hands of those two companies. Plan to withdraw to defensive positions under cover of darkness. I Company to withdraw also." Naturally, there had to be an anti-climax, provided in the notation of March 15 at 2230: "Second battalion closed in at 2230 relieving the third battalion."

SUBSTANTIALLY, that concluded the story of the Moselle. It was the end of action in the positive sense. The rest of it was waiting and watching--despite the promise contained in the earlier notation, also in the regimental journal: "14 March, 1040. Division CG in CP. Wants us to consider when we would prefer to cross the river."
This request was normal. The regiment had now reached a river. There had never been any hesitation in such a situation before. The thing to do was to cross it. Reports began flowing in from all the areas. Patrols were devised to feel out the territory into which the battalions would push on the other side. A number of French prisoners of war had been liberated in this section. They were questioned in detail and their information sifted and sifted till a coherent picture emerged. Even the German civilians were of use. Their main reaction seemed to have been one of relief. The Americans had arrived and for them--despite their nationality--the war was over. (Many of them, even, seemed to be distinctly out of harmony with Nazism.) There were in the town not a few civilians who had been in the bad graces of the "Party," and who were more than willing to give information and assistance.

One such individual supplied detailed information as to the river, the best possible crossing places, the percentages in using some of the existing piers and bridge sites, the disposition of civilians on the other side, the current reports on the withdrawal of the enemy, the fact that enemy elements were headed towards Bernkastel as the best escape route to the Rhine, and numberless other items which were priceless in forming accurate, positive pictures of the situation ahead. All this went back to regiment--and there the work went on apace. With everything possible at their disposal the command post worked overtime. Within twenty-four hours the plan was complete and on its way to Division. CT 304--as usual--was ready. They were sure they could make the crossing. Here was the plan of attack.

THEN they sat back and waited--and waited--and waited. Artillery came over and artillery went back. Patrols kept on, night after night. Battalion patrols. I & R patrols. Engineers investigated and planned. And nothing happened. The men were in billets. There was enemy strength across the river. Some of it close and some of it remote. GIs began again to familiarize themselves with the miracle of a fried egg, of fresh milk. They learned again what it meant to have a good eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. And they waited. Finally, the idea became pretty well established that there were other friendly elements cutting across in front of the regiment on the other side of the Moselle and that the 304th's hands--and for that matter the hands of the division--were tied on the subject of advance until such time as the disposition of these elements were fully known. The Moselle would keep on flowing without let or hindrance from CT 304 until this moment came. When it did--all well and good.
Again, inevitably, the foregoing account has bare spots. And again, it is necessary to flash back and to sketch in at least a part of that which is missing. The 2nd battalion had now replaced the 3rd on the line and the third was back in reserve for a well-merited rest. Artillery throughout this entire period had played a very important part and because of this it may be well to turn first again to the Artillery diary and read what it has to say.
"March 14th. Moved off in the attack at 0430 this morning. E Company moved east along the face of a long hill, while L Company marched along the river-side road below us. Daylight caught up with us when we had reached only half way. Machine-guns opened up on L Company from across the river and one man was hit but our company was concealed by the heavy fog or mist which still hung over the river. Easy Company moved into the west end of Cues without opposition and the (Artillery) section found an ideal OP in a high building, while the company moved east to mop up the town. (The company ran into small-arms fire and it was later learned that they came near to capturing a German general in the town.) The enemy was eliminated and a few prisoners captured, with our company receiving no casualties.

"HAD to wait a few hours to get observation but the fog cleared up about 1030 hours. I fired on a Jerry troop assembly, requesting time fire. Sgt. Ellenburg fired two missions--one on a Kraut OP and another on a pillbox. This was my idea of an ideal OP. We sat at a window in easy chairs, eating tenderloin steak sandwiches and giving the Jerry's doses of high explosive. Received orders to withdraw back to Lieser under cover of darkness. This we did, spending the night at our old CP. (March 15th.) At nightfall the company was ordered back to Maring to go into reserve. As Lt. Ugleston was to cross the river that night on a listening patrol the section remained behind to set up an OP down by the river side and give him artillery fire if he needed it. He and his men were unmolested during the patrol and they returned with news that they had heard enemy activity in the town across the river and also in the woods around the town. Returned to Maring and rejoined the company there at 0400. Bedded down."

It took until the night of the 18th and the early morning of the 19th before this unprecedented waiting at a river's edge was over. The actual jump-off for this last phase had occurred on March 11th. Strictly speaking, the phase had taken a full week to complete. Practically, however, the action was complete by the morning of the 14th with the occupation of Cues. The balance of the week was a period of marking time and waiting. Not passive waiting, of course, but with no activity beyond patrols, patrols and more patrols--and the usual constant, never ending, ever wakeful observation posts. All in all, action had never approached the intensity, the bitterness which marked the phases from Echternach until Wittlich. This feeling may have been strengthened by comparison, coming so soon after such names as Orenhofen and Hosten and Preist and Speicher.

The truth of the matter is that the acerbity of the entire action turned out to be far less than was actually expected at the outset. It seems fairly obvious, (though there is no official confirmation of this) that it was originally intended to cross the river as soon as reached. It is well enough indicated in the fact that Division had asked the regiment as to its preference in the matter of place and date for crossing. That this plan was not put into execution was clearly due to other friendly elements which had previously crossed the Moselle to the north of the CT 304 sector and were now cutting southwards. These might at any time heave into sight across the river. In addition, the Moselle was a wider river than any yet encountered and there were rear guard enemy elements left behind as they withdrew through Bernkastel. Though their strength was still somewhat of a question mark, this rear guard was in excellent position to impede, to harass any river crossing from the heights commanding the entire river valley. This rear guard certainly made the most of their opportunities till such time as the "resistance deadline" (which they must have been given) had been reached.