OUTSTANDING, though perhaps not consciously realized during this period, was the closer contact into which the GI came with civilians. Here he had his first real opportunity to judge for himself what the domestic life and civilian background of his enemy really was. Here, subconsciously, he began to be aware of how diametrically different these people were from anything American. He grew to know, too, how widely they varied amongst themselves from district to district, and from countryside to city, or, even from parish to parish within the same district.

Here the general sentiment seemed to be one of welcome with even an eagerness to help. Civilians offered gratuitous information which turned out to be of definite help in the frequent actions and patrols during that week at the Moselle.
An example was the final stage when 304th elements at last crossed over in strength. F Company had replaced I Company in Wehlen. The CO of Fox, 1st Lt. Reiter, had bestirred himself not a little, foreseeing the moment as close at hand when his company would cross. Only a short while before a patrol had returned with a civilian captive--who turned out to be more of a helper than a captive. Result: by the time the company actually started over in the engineer assault boats they had somehow or somewhere acquired the b|rgermeister of Bernkastel. This "worthy" actually surrendered the town to them before the crossing was even effected. He accompanied them in, preceding the entire column as a token of his good intentions.
Mention has been made that artillery dominated the action of these seven days. Witness the remark in the annals of Cannon Company: . . . "16 March, when the men thanked God first . . . for the safety of deep holes, as barrages of enemy artillery landed within ten yards of gun personnel--then succeeded in gathering information and aiding in counter-battery fire which eliminated the source of the trouble." And a little later: "The company, in mopping-up operations along the Moselle, fired over 500 rounds at various targets, including support for a patrol sent to clear out the 'thumb' near M|lheim, and fired in support of the crossing of the Moselle."

THE little-publicized Anti-Tank Company had its share of fun at about this time. Several references are available in one of the records. "From the time of the crossing into Germany until they reached the vicinity of the Moselle River they had fired but few rounds in combat. They had 'followed the book.' But it seemed that, because of the nature of the terrain and the consistent absence of enemy armor, something new had to be devised. A gun is not much help to the Infantry if it is not fired-no matter what the book says. While in this vicinity, therefore, they adopted the idea of mounting the gun in the bed of a 2= ton truck, thus making the towed gun into an SP (self-propelled). This was tried with one, purely as an experiment, but proved so successful that all nine guns were thus mounted . . . The 3rd platoon was sent to Monzel both for A-T support and to furnish direct fire on the enemy positions across the Moselle. Establishing positions in a vineyard during the night they prepared to put an end to any enemy movements on the roads opposite and across the river. For offensive work of this nature direct fire is unbeatable and, adding to this their position of vantage on the hill, they felt very sure and confident of themselves. In very short order they had the village (Filzen) opposite from them afire, blasting an 88 mm gun position as a primary target. The 88 did not return the fire--so it must have been 'beaten to the draw.' A thick woods behind the burning town looked ideal for OPs and gun positions. Purely as a precaution, therefore, ten rounds of HE splashed with crimson flames through the trees in that spot. Almost as if in echo mortar shells screamed in on the platoon position, saturating the area, but the A-T fire was never slackened . . . No enemy transportation was sighted or, perhaps, none attempted to travel that night. The next morning the 304th went across the river."
The crossings were made at Wehlen and at M|lheim. As the crow flies, between them, is no more than a distance of four kilometers. But following the course of the river, or by road along the river, the distance is actually ten kilometers. The Moselle at this point almost bends back upon itself. Third battalion made the crossing in the south, passing through 1st battalion elements, and the 2nd battalion went over through Wehlen. Again, as had been true so often before, one of the biggest problems was that of mines. The casualties the regiment had at this point were entirely from this cause. The 3rd battalion surgeon's diary gives a vivid word picture of what these dangers were: "As usual when the opposition just sits and waits on the banks of a stream, the banks were mined. K Company started across in one area. 1st battalion had crossed elsewhere. A small path had been taken by some of K Company's men. One hit a mine and was killed instantly while another was critically injured. Lt. Abernethy tried to prevent (our) new aid-man, McGee, (Pvt. William D. McGee, 35573768) from going in for the men but the kid couldn't be stopped. He got in, gave MS (morphine) to Jasper Holm of K, shifted his own position and was blown sky high by a trip wire mine . . . we got the information and got Holm and McGee into the aid station . . . McGee was still full of fight but in bad shape. He kept chattering. Gave him considerable plasma and shipped him back-hopefully . . . He died the next day. A great kid with plenty of guts."

AT Wehlen the troop crossing was made by means of assault boats provided and manned by the Company A engineers of the 301st. At M|lheim the same outfit in the absence of a bridge devised a pontoon raft with outboard motors and spent the next twenty-four hours while the bridge was being finished, ferrying men and vehicles across. It was they also who were given the unenviable task of clearing mines and blazing a path through these fields. "That night we crossed the Moselle in an infantry-support raft with our detectors . . . infantrymen had informed us that the other side was alive with mines and booby-traps . . . We started our mission without infantry support and had men of our own platoon out as a point . . . entered a town where the infantry had not as yet been . . . in Bernkastel took our first prisoners!"
If an acceleration in the tempo of movement was noticeable at any one spot at all, this was probably it. More than in any "other way, perhaps, it could be seen in the assignments handed out to the I & R platoon. Observation posts became things of the past, route reconnaissance and contact missions more and more frequent. The very same day that Blue battalion completed their crossing at M|lheim, the I & R received just such a mission. That was the 19th. Almost a full complement of the platoon, led by Lt. Cloud and Platoon Sgt. Whetstone, took off early that morning and scoured cross country and along mountain cow-paths--by jeep--until they achieved their mission and met the American elements cutting down from the north. Regimental journal records: "Lt. Cloud back from Morbach where he contacted Col. Sills of the 16th Cav. Sq., 16th Gr., 316th Brig. Last reports are that he had 2 troops (leading elements) at Kempfeld at 1500, one pushing on to Fischbach, one skirting river, turning SE at Cues."
The very next day the same men started out again--this time on route reconnaissance. Again the journal gives the story. "20 March, 0845, Co. A, 301st Engineers will have mission of clearing road from Bernkastel in direction of our new area. They will not be with us during the move. If they should run into any opposition, we will have to furnish assistance." Naturally the obvious source of "assistance" was the I & R platoon; as witness the next notation, entered at 1095; "I & R platoon, 1 section of HMG and 1 platoon of Co. A, 301st Engr. left on mission." (Once again they were off on a mission with the now familiar Lt. Butler and his men.) This was route reconnaissance, pure and simple. It developed later that it was for supply purposes rather than reasons of troop convoy--either, of course, being equally important.
When that job of work was done they started out again on reconnaissance and patrol. From here on out it was a rapid sequence of such missions. Patrols were distributed throughout the entire regiment. They came from the battalions and the companies in addition to the regular I & R work schedule. Sometimes they made sense immediately, sometimes the impression existed that the staff was merely keeping the men from growing rusty. (Although in justice it must be admitted that eventually a good substantial reason always showed up to justify missions.) Throughout, however, there ran one single thread of method and rhyme and reason. This was on the way to the Rhine.

THERE seemed to be a sort of symmetry in the manner in which the regiment approached this river. They had encountered many streams before this one and each had seemed to be a little larger, a little deeper, a trifle more strongly defended. But each had been further and further into Germany. Now the Moselle was behind them. This had been the largest yet--and, strangely enough, apart from the time at the Sauer--the waiting period on its banks had been the longest also. Of course, it had not been supposed to be the Moselle at all-but the Rhine. That was the original destination when the Combat Team started out in a mad dash from the Kyll. In mid-course, destination had been changed and the entire spearhead veered down to the Moselle instead. For the men of the regiment this seemed to have had the effect merely of whetting the appetite. The Rhine grew to have for them a significance, a symbolism which no other spot in Germany represented. It was well-nigh a superstition: Would they ever reach the Rhine?
Well, here it was--now! CT 304 would not be the first American elements to breach this natural defense barrier--but, at least they knew that when it came they would not be found wanting. The record spoke for itself.
What was that record, when one came right down to brass tacks? It had started way back on the Sauer at Echternach--how long ago was that, when the 304th had gone into attack?--years ago, it seemed and felt. But what was the actual date? Across the Sauer on the 23rd of February--that could be taken as the entry into real, positive combat action. Was that all the time which had elapsed? Six days in February and twenty days in March--a grand total of twenty-six. It did not seem possible; only twenty-six days. From the Sauer to the Rhine: from Luxembourg and through the vaunted Siegfried Line, across rivers and mountains, over the winding Moselle and, with another long leap, over to the river.

TWENTY-SIX days--and what had been the cost? In records, in army files and tabulations, in the cold figures of tactics and deployments this would add up to unemotional columns of figures of KIAs and WIAs and MIAS, of battle-lost equipment, of supplies, of rounds of ammunition. But the real cost was not there. It was in the hearts and souls of youngsters who a short few months ago had been in school, normal and carefree, and who today had left all that behind them and who nevermore, in heart or soul, after Orenhofen or Noviand or Maring or Hosten or Holsthum or Alsdorf could be completely young again. The cost was in the very smallest drop of American blood to be shed on this foreign soil--since, once that first drop had been shed, the value of it could not ever be exceeded by succeeding drops, a paradoxical truism if ever there was one. This price, this cost was completely beyond measure. And American soldiers (being just what that said,--Americans and soldiers both) never stopped to measure this price.
Measure the price?--of what?--of proving that our way of life was right? You couldn't ever put a price on that!
And so they did the most natural thing in the world for American soldiers to do. Being at the Rhine they set their vision on what lay beyond the Rhine--and itched to get across and at it!